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Abstract. Conventional fault tree analysis in safety analysis of complex
engineering systems calculates the occurrence probability of the top un-
desired event using probabilistic failure rates. However, it is often very
difficult to obtain those failure rates well in advance due to insufficient
data, environment changing or new components. Fuzzy numbers can be
applied to estimate failure rates by handling linguistic terms. This study
proposes a hybrid approach of Fuzzy Numbers and Fault Tree Analysis
to solve the conventional problem and describes its procedures using a
case study of emergency core cooling system of a typical nuclear power
plant.
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1 Introduction
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is widely used for safety analysis of complex engineer-
ing systems such as nuclear power plants (NPPs). Conventional FTA utilizes fail-
ure rates of every individual basic event constructing the tree to approximately
calculate the occurrence probability of the top undesired event. However, it is
often very difficult to exactly estimate the basic event failure rates due to insuf-
ficient data, environment changing or new components.
Fuzzy probabilities have been introduced to calculate the failure probability
of a typical emergency cooling system using FTA [1]. The occurrence probabil-
ity of the top undesired event is calculated using fuzzy multiplication rules for
the Boolean AND gate and fuzzy complementation rules for the Boolean OR
gate. However, this approach is limited only for trapezoidal fuzzy numbers. It
also does not consider qualitative analysis and criticality analysis. The α−cut
method has been introduced to calculate the failure probability of the reac-
tor protective system (WASH-1400) [2]. All basic events are assumed to have
probability distributions prior to designing triangular fuzzy numbers. The point
2median value and the error factor are used to represent the lower bound and
the upper bound of the triangular fuzzy numbers. The middle value of the tri-
angular fuzzy numbers is represented by the point median value. However, this
approach does not consider qualitative analysis prior to estimating the occurence
probability of the top event. A computational system analysis for FTA called
FuzzyFTA has been developed and implemented to calculate the failure proba-
bility of Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFWS) of Angra-I Westinghouse NPP [3]
and containment cooling system (CCS) of a typical four-loops pressurized water
reactor [4]. However, this methodology is applicable only for triangular fuzzy
numbers.
This paper proposes a Fuzzy Numbers based Fault Tree Analysis (FNFTA)
approach. The approach combines probabilistic method with fuzzy numbers to
estimate the failure probability of the top event. Fuzzy numbers can be in trian-
gular and/or in trapezoidal form. The paper is organized as follows. The fuzzy
numbers, fuzzy possibility scores and failure rates are explained in Section 2.
Section 3 discusses the structure of the FNFTA approach and its procedures.
In Section 4, a case study for NPPs shows the applicability of the approach.
Finally, Section 5 summarizes future research tasks.
2 Fuzzy Numbers, Fuzzy Possibility Scores and Failure
Rates
2.1 Fuzzy Numbers
A fuzzy number A is a subset of real line R whose membership function fA(x)
can be continuously mapping from R into a closed interval [0,w] where 0 ≤ w ≤ 1
[5]. A normal fuzzy number A is expressed as follows.
fA(x) =

fLA(x), a ≤ x ≤ b
1, b ≤ x ≤ c
fRA (x), c ≤ x ≤ d
0, otherwise
where fLA(x):[a,b]→ [0,1] and fRA(x):[c,d]→ [0,1]. If both fLA(x) and fRA(x) are linear,
then the fuzzy number A is a trapezoidal fuzzy number and usually denoted by
A = (a,b,c,d). When b = c, the trapezoidal fuzzy number becomes the triangular
fuzzy number.
2.2 Fuzzy Possibility Scores
Fuzzy possibility score (FPS) is a crisp score that represents experts belief of the
most likely score that an event may occur [6][7]. Centroid-based distance method
is to convert fuzzy numbers into fuzzy possibility scores [8]. The centroid (x0,y0)
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The FPS of fuzzy number A is the Euclidean distance of fuzzy number A,




(x0)2 + (y0)2 (3)
2.3 Fuzzy Failure Rates
Fuzzy failure rate (FFR) is an error rate which is obtained by dividing the
frequency of an error with the total chance that an event may have error [7].




1 + (K × log(1/Em)3) (4)
where e is analogous to FPS and Em is the most likely fault rate. K is a constant,
which represents the safety criterion based on the lowest lower bound of the
error rate and error rates of a routine. Onisawa defined that K = 2.301. Em is
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3 The Structure of the FNFTA Approach
The FNFTA approach consists of four analysis phases, which are system analysis
phase, qualitative analysis phase, quantitative analysis phase, and criticality
analysis phase (Fig. 1).
Phase 1: System Analysis Phase. System performance is analysed to build a
fault tree describing failure modes that may occur to the system during its life
time. This output becomes input to the second phase.
Phase 2: Qualitative Analysis Phase. Repeating events are removed from the
fault tree by identifying cut sets and minimal cut sets. The output of this phase
is a simplified fault tree which is equivalent to the fault tree obtained in the first
phase but it is free from repeating events. This output becomes input to the
third phase. Figure 2 shows the flowchart of this phase.
4Fig. 1. The structure of the FNFTA approach
Fig. 2. The flowchart for qualitative analysis phase
Phase 3: Quantitative Analysis Phase. All basic events constructing the simpli-
fied fault tree are divided into two different evaluation techniques; probabilistic
method and fuzzy numbers. The failure rates of basic events, which are evalu-
ated using probabilistic method, can be obtained from reliable documents. The
failure rates of other basic events are estimated using fuzzy numbers, which are
designed based on expert justifications. These fuzzy numbers then are converted
into FPS and finally into FFR. After all basic events have failure rates, Boolean
algebra is used to estimate the occurrence probability of the top undesired event.
The occurrence probability of the top event for two independent events for OR
gate and AND gate are given in [11].
PT = PA + PB − PA × PB (6)
PT = PA × PB (7)
where PA and PB are the failure rates of basic event A and basic event B,
respectively. The output of this phase is the occurrence probability of the top
undesired event and is an input to the fourth phase. Figure 3 shows the flowchart
of this phase.
Phase 4: Criticality Analysis Phase. This phase evaluates how far a basic event
contributes to the occurrence of the top undesired event by calculating the crit-
icality index of every basic event. Based on the calculated criticality index, the
order of critical components can be justified. Fussell-Vesely (FV) importance
5Fig. 3. The flowchart for quantitative analysis phase






where R0 is the probability of the top event for overall basic events and R−i is
the probability of the top event by setting the probability of basic event i to 0.
Decision makers use this criticality index to improve the safety features of the
analyzed NPP. Figure 4 shows the flowchart of this phase.
Fig. 4. The flowchart for criticality analysis phase
4 A Case Study for Nuclear Power Plants
The failure of a typical emergency core cooling system (ECCS) which is adopted
from [1] is used to demonstrate the applicability of this approach. ECCS works
to mitigate the consequences of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). There are two
6operation modes of this ECCS, automatic operation and manual operation. The
manual operation will only work when the automatic operation fails to mitigate
the accident. Further details on this ECCS operation can be found in [1].
Phase 1: System Analysis Phase. In this case study, only the failure scenario
of the automatic operation is analyzed. The fault tree describing the failure
scenario of this operation mode is shown in Fig. 5. The top undesired event is
the failure of automatic ECCS (FAECCS).
Fig. 5. The fault tree for FAECCS
Phase 2: Qualitative Analysis Phase. FAECCS in Fig. 5 still has one repeating
event, which is a basic event X6. This repeating event can be removed using the
combination of MOCUS algorithm and the rules of Boolean algebra to obtain
cut sets and minimal cut sets [13].
The MOCUS algorithm evaluates events starting from the top events down
to the bottom events. Every intermediate events found in the evaluation process
will be substituted by the lower events. In Fig. 5, FAECCS can be represented
by (A4 + A2 + X11 + X12 + X6 + X13 + A3) where A4, A2 and A3 are
intermediate events. A4 then can be represented by (X1 + X2 + A7 + A8),
A2 by (X14 + A5) and A3 by (X17 + A6). Therefore the FAECCS can be
represented by (X1 + X2 + A7 + A8 + X14 + A5 + X11 + X12 + X6 +
X13 + X17 + A6). Using the same procedures for the next intermediate events
found and by implementing the law of Boolean algebra absorption, the final
representation of FAECCS are (X1 + X2 + (X3 . X4) + X5 + ((X7 + X8) . (X9
+ X10)) + X6 + X14 + (X15 . X16) + X11 + X12 + X13 + X17 + (X18 . X19))
where symbol dot (.) represents AND gate and symbol plus (+) represents OR
gate in the tree. This final representation as depicted in Fig. 6 is a simplified
fault tree of the fault tree in Fig. 5.
Phase 3: Quantitative Analysis Phase. In this phase, basic events are classified
into two evaluation groups, which are probabilistic method and fuzzy numbers.
For illustrative purposes only, we just simply evaluate basic events X1, X2, X3,
X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X11, and X12 using probabilistic method and all these
7Fig. 6. The simplified fault tree
events are assumed to have probabilistic failure rates of 1.5× 10−4. Other basic
events are evaluated using fuzzy numbers. Basic events X9, X10, X12, X13, and
X14 are evaluated using triangular fuzzy numbers of (0.1,0.15,0.25,0.3); mean-
while basic events X15, X16, X17, X18, and X19 are evaluated using trapezoidal
fuzzy numbers of (0.1,0.25,0.3).
By solving (1) and (2) and substitute a = 0.1, b = 0.15, c = 0.25 and d
= 0.3 for trapezoidal fuzzy numbers, we obtain x0 = 0.2 and y0 = 0.444444.
FPS is then calculated using (3) and the result is 0.48737. Finally, this FPS is
substituted into (5) to calculate FFR and the result is 4.57 × 10−3. With the
same procedures, FFR for the triangular fuzzy numbers is 2.275× 10−3.
Using (6), the occurrence probability of intermediate event A10 and A11 are
2.0×10−4 and 4.54×10−3, respectively. Using (7), the occurrence probability of
intermediate event A9 is 1.36×10−6. With the same procedures, the occurrence
probability of FAECCS is 2.1414× 10−2.






The FV importances of other basic events in Table 1 are calculated using the
same procedures. Basic events X15, X16 and X17 are the most critical compo-
Table 1. The FV importance and the critical order of basic events






nents followed by basic events X12, X13 and X14. These basic events need to be
redesigned or changed in order to improve the reliability of FAECCS.
85 Summary and Future Works
Three advantages are gained from this FNFTA approach. (1) Probabilistic fail-
ure rate can be combined with fuzzy numbers to solve the limitation of the
conventional FTA. (2) The calculation of the failure probability of the top unde-
sired event is more accurate than the previous fuzzy approach because cut sets
and minimal cut sets are evaluated first in the qualitative analysis phase prior
to the quantitative analysis phase. (3) The approach can be used to estimate
the critical components and therefore decision makers can redesign or change
critical components to improve the safety features of the system being analyzed.
For future works, the conversion functions from fuzzy numbers into FFR need
to be investigated in real-case studies.
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